#### Games with Sequential Backtracking and Complete Game Semantics for Intuitionistic, EM-1, and Classical Arithmetic Workshop on Logical Dialogue games Thursday, June 29, 2015, Wien

Stefano Berardi C.S. Dept., Turin University, <u>http://www.di.unito.it/~stefano</u> Makoto Tatsuta, National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo <u>http://research.nii.ac.jp/~tatsuta/</u>

#### Abstract of the Talk

- 1. Starting from any game with possibly turn conflict, we add the rule of **Sequential Backtracking** for one player.
- If we start from Tarski games, we obtain a sound and complete game semantics for IPA<sup>-</sup>, Arithmetic with implication as a primitive connective and EM-1, Excluded Middle restricted to 1-quantifier formulas.
- 3. There is a tree isomorphism (a kind of ``Curry Howard'' isomorphism) between: proofs of IPA<sup>-</sup>, expressed by an infinitary sequent calculus, and the winning strategies for games with sequential backtracking. We may ``run'' proofs as game strategies.
- 4. This isomorphism interprets arithmetical sub-classical proofs as programs which learn by trials and errors. These results extend to Intuitionistic and Classical Arithmetic.

#### **Comparing with Polarized Games**

- 1. We produce a complete model for EM-1. There is no obvious way to restrict Polarized games in order to give a complete semantics of EM-1.
- 2. Polarized games give a complete game theoretical model of **provability in Classical logic**. We produce a complete model of **truth for full Classical Arithmetic**.
- 3. In Polarized games,  $\lambda\mu$ -terms are in one-to-one with recursive winning strategies. In our game semantics,  $\lambda\mu$ -**terms representing different classical proofs** may be interpreted by the same recursive winning strategy.
- 4. Our interpretation produces a simplified representation of the classical proof as programs, focused on input/output behavior, on the way the stack of previous states is used, and skipping all the rest.

# §1. Games with turn conflicts

- There are two players, **£** (Eloise) and **A** (Abelard).
- The set of rules for a game G with turn conflicts is a tree with nodes and edges having the color either of *£* or of *A*.
   Nodes are positions of the game, edges are moves.
- The play starts at the root of G. At each turn, a player may: either **drop out** and lose the game, or move from the current node **along an edge of his color**, or **wait** for his opponent's move.
- If both £ or ¾ want to move, or both want to wait, we say there is a turn conflict. In this case, the player having the color the node succumbs, and must change its choice.

#### An example of turn conflict



Both  $\mathfrak{X}$  or  $\mathfrak{A}$  may move from a node having the color of  $\mathfrak{A}$ . If both want to move,  $\mathfrak{A}$  waits and  $\mathfrak{X}$  moves. If both want to wait,  $\mathfrak{A}$  moves and  $\mathfrak{X}$  waits.  $\mathfrak{A}$  is the player having the color the node, the **succumbing player**, therefore he is forced to **change its choice**.

## Winner of a game

- In any **leaf** of G there are no moves left for both players: the succumbing player is **forced to drop out**.
- The player who drops out loses.
- If G is a finite game (all branches of G are finite), we decide in this way the winner for all plays.
- Otherwise there are infinite plays. In this case, G is equipped with two disjoint sets of infinite plays: W<sub>f</sub> and W<sub>f</sub>.
- $\mathfrak{F}$  wins if the infinite play is in  $W_{\mathfrak{F}}$ , and  $\mathfrak{F}$  wins if the infinite play is in  $W_{\mathfrak{F}}$ . Otherwise both players loses.

#### Games without turn conflict



When all edges have the same color of the initial node of the edge, we obtain the usual notion of game, without turn conflicts.

## Adding backtracking simplifies strategies

- Winning strategy for a game G are often non-recursive, even when G is a recursive tree.
- If we allow £ to retract finitely many times her move, many winning strategies for £ become recursive. In fact, winning strategies for £ become programs learning the correct move by trial and error.
- We may extend any game **G** with conflict with the possibility for **£** of retracting any previous move.
- This notion of game is new: we call it G with Sequential Backtracking or Seq(G). Seq(G) always has turn conflicts, even if G had no conflicts.

## A new notion of game: Seq(G)

- The color of a node in Seq(G) is the same as in G.
- The moves of *F* in Seq(G) and in G are the same.
- from any position in Seq(G) (of any color), and has two kinds of possible moves.
- Explicit Backtracking. £ may come back to any previous node in the history of the play, then £ duplicates it as next move
- 2. Implicit Backtracking. ₤ may come back to any previous node in the history of the play from which ₤ may move, then ₤ produces a move in the original G from it as next move.

#### The winner of an infinite play in Seq(G)

- We include here the winning condition for infinite plays of Seq(G) only in the case G is a finite play. In this case we ask: all infinite plays in Seq(G) are won by *A*.
- Why? In Seq(G), *£* is allowed to retract finitely many times her previous move, but only in order to find a better move by trial-and-error.
- If G is a finite play, a play in Seq(G) is infinite only if *f* changes infinitely many times her move from a given node, just to waste time and to avoid losing the game.
- This behavior is unfair and therefore is penalized: *£* loses any infinite play.

### Adding Sequential Backtracking to Tarski games

- We define Classical(A)=Seq(Tarski(A)) the game obtained adding sequential backtracking to the Tarski game for A.
- Adding backtracking does not change the winner, but makes the winning strategy recursive. The winning strategy is now a program learning the winning moves by trial-and-error. Any wrong move of *£* may be changed, provided we find the right one in finite time.

# §2. Proofs as programs which learn.

- In Classical(A), classical proofs of A are interpred as programs learning the value of a witness for an existential statement by trial-and-error. This is possible even when no program computing the witness exists. We include a toy example with primitive implication (this is new).
- Assume P is any recursive predicate such that the predicate ∃y.P(x,y) is <u>not</u> recursive. We claim that *𝔅* has a winning strategy from the judgement:

true.EM<sub>1</sub> = true. $\forall x.(\exists y.P(x,y) \rightarrow \perp \lor \exists y.P(x,y))$ but  $\mathfrak{X}$  has no recursive winning strategy, unless we

allow backtracking.



If P(a,b) is true, then true.P(a,b) is conjunctive, with the color of  $\mathcal{A}$ .  $\mathcal{A}$  should move, he cannot and he drops out.



#### Implementing a restricted form of Backtracking

- There is a restriction of backtracking we call EM<sub>1</sub>backtracking, in which whenever some positive formulas are discarded from the history of the play, they are never restored.
- Theorem (Completeness of EM<sub>1</sub>-backtracking) EM<sub>1</sub>-backtracking validates exactly the theorems of IPA<sup>-</sup> (formulas with implication which are intuitionistic consequences of EM<sub>1</sub> and of recursive ω-rule).
- The interest of this result lies in the possibility of ``running'' some classical proofs using less memory space and less memory structure, therefore less time.
- If we restrict backtracking to a positive formula to **the last positive formula**, then we obtain Intuit. Arithmetic +  $\omega$ -rule.

#### Conclusion

- The proof/strategy isomorphism provides a way of describing classical proofs as programs which learn, alternative to Griffin's use of continuations.
- With respect to the original isomorphism proposed by H. Herbelin, we added implication as primitive connective.
- The challenge is now to provide some **implementation** of proofs suggested by this new way of looking at proofs.
- The study of game semantics may provide further information: if we have a proof with a limited use of classical logic (say, using EM<sub>1</sub>-logic), its interpretation as strategy makes a limited use of backtracking, therefore it has a simpler implementation.
- Differently from Polarized games, our interpretation cannot be used to represents the  $\lambda\mu$ -formulation of classical proofs.

# Index

- §1. Games with conflicts.
- §2. Proofs as programs which learn.
- **Appendix 1.** A definition of Tarski games over judgements.
- Appendix 2. A formulation of Classical Arithmetic PA + ω-rule satisfying the proof/strategy isomorphism (for proofs in a simplified form)

#### Appendix 1. Tarski games over judgements

- Tarski games are the canonical notion of games (without turn conflicts) representing the truth of an arithmetical statement. In order to define Tarski games, we consider a first order language L: True, False, ∨, ∧, ¬, →, ∀, ∃, with all primitive recursive predicates and functions.
- We define a relation <1 (immediate subformula) for closed formulas of L. We set A <1 ¬A and:</li>

A, B <<sub>1</sub> A $\lor$ B, A $\land$ B, A $\rightarrow$ B

 $A[t/x] <_1 \forall x.A, \exists x.A$  (for all closed terms t)

# Disjunctive, conjunctive, positive and negative formulas

- $A \lor B$ ,  $\exists x.A$ ,  $A \rightarrow B$ ,  $\neg A$  are **disjunctive** formulas.
- A $\land$ B,  $\forall$ x.A are **conjunctive** formulas.
- A <<sub>1</sub> A→B, ¬A is a negative subformula. In all other cases A <<sub>1</sub> C is a positive subformula.
- Disjunctive formulas correspond to sending an output (to the outside), conjunctive formula to receiving an input (from the outside).
- Negative formulas correspond to questions (both from us and from outside) and positive formulas to answers (both from us and from outside).

# Disjunctive, conjunctive, positive and negative "judgements"

- Judgements: J = s.A, where either s=true or s=false.
- true.A is a positive judgement. true.A is disjunctive (conjunctive) iff A disjunctive (conjunctive).
- false.A is a negative judgement. false.A is disjunctive (conjunctive) iff A conjunctive (disjunctive).
- s.A<<sub>1</sub>t.B if and only if: A <<sub>1</sub> B, and s=t if A is a positive subformula of B, and s≠t if A is a negative subformula.
- For instance, **false.A**, **true.B** <<sub>1</sub> **true.A**→**B**.
- We write a conjunctive judgement J as ∧<sub>i∈I</sub>J<sub>i</sub> for all J<sub>i</sub> <<sub>1</sub>
   J, and a disjunctive judgement J as ∨<sub>i∈I</sub>J<sub>i</sub> for all J<sub>i</sub> <<sub>1</sub>J.

# The game Tarski(s.A)

- We write ≤ for the transitive closure of <<sub>1</sub>. For each judgement s.A we define Tarski(s.A), the game associated to the notion of truth for s.A. We write Tarski(A) for Tarski(true.A).
- The nodes of Tarski(s.A) are all judgements t.B ≤ s.A. The root is s.A, the child/father relation is t.B <<sub>1</sub> u.C.
- Disjunctive formulas and edges from them are colored £, conjunctive formulas and edges from them are colored A.
- Theorem (Completeness for Tarski games and Truth). 乏 has an arithmetical winning strategy from Tarski(A) if and only if A is true. The strategy selects a true immediate subjudgement if any exists.

# Appendix 2. A formulation of PA+ω-rule with the proof/strategy isomorphism

- The language of  $PA+\omega$ -rule are all judgements. Any judgement is of the form  $\bigvee_{i \in I} J_i$  or  $\bigwedge_{i \in I} J_i$ . Say: true.A $\rightarrow B$  =  $\bigvee$ {false.A,true.B} and false.A $\rightarrow B=\land$ {true.A, false.B}.
- Sequents of CL<sub>ω</sub> are ordered lists of judgements. Therefore Contraction and Exchange rules are not built-in in the notion of sequent.
- We explicitly assume Contraction in  $PA+\omega$ -rule. We hyde Exchange rule through the fact that the active formula, if disjunctive, may be in any position in the sequent.
- Identity rule is trivially derivable in PA+ω-rule. Cut rule is derivable as well, but highly non-trivial.

#### A formulation of PA+ω-rule with 3 rules (in one-side form, with judgements)



# $\begin{array}{ll} \underline{\Gamma, \wedge_{i \in I} J_{\underline{i}}, J_{\underline{i}}} & (all \ i \in I) \\ \Gamma, \wedge_{i \in I} J_{\underline{i}} & for \ all \ i \in I, \ and \ \underline{recursively} \ in \ i) \end{array}$

**Remark** the asymmetry with  $\vee$ : we do <u>not</u> have  $\Gamma, \wedge_{i \in I} J, \Delta$ 



(contraction with implicit exchange)

#### Proof/Strategy Isomorphism and Cut-Elimination Theorem

**Theorem**. Let A be any closed arithmetical formula.

- (Soundness and Completeness) A formula A is a theorem of PA+ω-rule if and only if £ has a recursive winning strategies on the game Classical(true.A).
- 2. (Curry-Howard) The recursive winning strategy-trees for  $\mathfrak{X}$  on Classical(true.A) are tree-isomorphic to the infinitary recursive cut-free proof-trees of A in PA+ $\omega$ -rule.
- **3.** (*Cut-Elimination*) It is translated in a gametheoretical result: "any dialogue between two terminating strategies for *£* on Classical(true.A) and Classical(false.A) is **terminating**".

#### Bibliography

[As1] F. Aschieri. Learning Based Realizability for HA + EM1 and 1-Backtracking Games: Soundness and Completeness. To appear on APAL.

- [As2] F. Aschieri. *Learning, Realizability and Games in Classical Arithmetic.* Ph. D. thesis, Torino, 2011.
- [Be1] S. Berardi, T. Coquand, and S. Hayashi. *Games with 1backtracking.* APAL, 2010.

[Be2] S. Berardi and M. Tatsuta. Positive Arithmetic Without Exchange Is a Subclassical Logic. In Zhong Shao, editor, APLAS, volume 4807 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 271-285. Springer, 2007.

#### Bibliography

- [Be3] S. Berardi and Y. Yamagata. A Sequent Calculus for Limit ComputableMathematics. APAL, 153(1-3):111-126, 2008.
- [Coq] T. Coquand. A Semantics of Evidence for Classical Arithmetic. JSL, 60(1):325-337, 1995.
- [Fel] W. Felscher. *Dialogues as a foundation for intuitionistic logic.* In D.M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Vol. III, pages 341–372. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1986.
- [Her] Hugo Herbelin. A Lambda-Calculus Structure Isomorphic to Gentzen-Style Sequent Calculus Structure. <u>CSL 1994</u>: 61-75

#### Bibliography

[Laur1]

**O. Laurent**: *Polarized games*. Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 130(1-3) : 79-123 (2004). In:

http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/journals/apal/apal130.html#Laurent04
[Laur2]

O. Laurent: *Game semantics for first-order logic*. Logical Methods in Computer Science 6(4)