

# Proof theory for deontic logic inspired by Indian Philosophy

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# What's the problem?



## Main idea:

Use logic to formally analyse ancient texts of Indian Philosophy


## Expected benefits:

- ▶ **Indology:** A better understanding of the texts and clarification through formalisation
- ▶ **Logic:** New inputs and development of new methods


Reasoning tools for Deontic Logic  
and Applications to Indian Sacred Texts

<https://mimamsa.logic.at>


## How do we formalise?



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So we use **Proof Theory** to do the **dirty work!**

# What kind of Indian Philosophy?

We consider texts of the **Mīmāṃsā** school:

- ▶ **Main period of activity**  
last centuries BCE to beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> century
- ▶ **Main focus**  
interpretation of the prescriptive portions of the Vedas
- ▶ **Main tool**  
formulation of general rules and interpretative principles (nyāyas) to interpret the texts

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~> **Deontic Logic**
- ▶ **Main tool**  
formulation of general rules and interpretative principles  
(nyāyas) to interpret the texts  
~> **Axioms**

## But why this kind of Indian Philosophy – Why Mīmāṃsā?

- ▶ **Suitability:** The clear formulation of Mīmāṃsā interpretative principles lends itself to formalisation
- ▶ **Historical significance:** Mīmāṃsā is one of the main schools of Indian Philosophy and considered early deontic logic
- ▶ **Importance:** The Mīmāṃsā principles are used in Indian court cases even today
- ▶ **Novelty:** Mīmāṃsā texts have scarcely been considered from the modern Western point of view due to:
  - ▶ Lack of translations
  - ▶ Often highly metaphorical language



## Part 1: The logic – formalising the key concepts

# Preliminaries: The language

## How to model propositional reasoning?

*When there is a contradiction, at the denial of one alternative, the other is known (to be true).*

(Interpretation of Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, 9<sup>th</sup> c. CE)

↪ classical propositional logic

## How to model the deontic concepts?

Mīmāṃsā authors use **eligibility conditions** for prescriptions, e.g.

*The one who desires heaven should sacrifice with the Full- and New-moon Sacrifices*

↪ dyadic deontic operators

**Note:** We base our logic on propositions instead of actions.

## Preliminaries: The language, formally

The **formulae** of deontic logic are given by:

$$p \in \text{Var} \mid \perp \mid \neg A \mid A \wedge B \mid A \vee B \mid A \rightarrow B \mid \mathcal{O}(A/B) \mid \mathcal{F}(A/B)$$

They are interpreted in the standard way:

- ▶  $\mathcal{O}(A/B) \rightsquigarrow$  “Given that  $B$  is the case, it is obligatory that  $A$  is the case”
- ▶  $\mathcal{F}(A/B) \rightsquigarrow$  “Given that  $B$  is the case, it is forbidden that  $A$  is the case”

As base calculus we assume the (Hilbert-)axioms and rules of classical propositional logic and the **congruence rules**

$$\frac{\vdash A \leftrightarrow C \quad \vdash B \leftrightarrow D}{\vdash \mathcal{O}(A/B) \leftrightarrow \mathcal{O}(C/D)} \qquad \frac{\vdash A \leftrightarrow C \quad \vdash B \leftrightarrow D}{\vdash \mathcal{F}(A/B) \leftrightarrow \mathcal{F}(C/D)}$$

## The logic: Axioms

*When, on the other hand, coming into being [of something needed] [...] are not realized by another prescription, [the principal prescription] itself begets the four [stages] of coming into being [...] [of the prescriptions] connected to itself.*

(Rāmānujācārya, *Tantrahasya* IV.4.3.3)

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*If a prescription enjoins something which has requirements, then it enjoins the requirements as well.*

$$\frac{\vdash A \rightarrow B}{\vdash \mathcal{O}(A/C) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}(B/C)}$$

## The logic: More axioms

Given that purposes  $Y$  and  $Z$  exclude each other, if one should *use  $X$  for the purpose  $Y$* , then it cannot be the case that one should *use it at the same time for the purpose  $Z$* .

(Interpretation of Kumāriila, *Tantravārttika* on PMS 1.3.3)

$$\rightsquigarrow \frac{\vdash \neg(A \wedge B)}{\vdash \neg(\mathcal{O}(A/C) \wedge \mathcal{O}(B/C))}$$

If conditions  $X$  and  $Y$  are always equivalent, given the duty to perform  $Z$  under conditions  $X$ , the same duty applies under  $Y$ .

(Interpretation of Śabara, PMS 6.1.25)

$$\rightsquigarrow \frac{\vdash B \leftrightarrow C}{\vdash \mathcal{O}(A/B) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}(A/C)}$$

## Making the logic useful: Sequents

These rules are equivalent to dyadic deontic logic **MD**:

$$(M) \mathcal{O}(A \wedge B/C) \rightarrow \mathcal{O}(A/C)$$

$$(D) \neg(\mathcal{O}(A/B) \wedge \mathcal{O}(\neg A/B))$$

$$\frac{\vdash A \leftrightarrow C \quad \vdash B \leftrightarrow D}{\vdash \mathcal{O}(A/B) \leftrightarrow \mathcal{O}(C/D)} \text{Cg}$$


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(Turning the handle to  
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
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(Turning the handle to get analytic calculus)

$$\frac{A \Rightarrow C \quad B \Rightarrow D \quad D \Rightarrow B}{\Gamma, \mathcal{O}(A/B) \Rightarrow \mathcal{O}(C/D), \Delta} \text{Mon}_1$$
$$\frac{A, C \Rightarrow B \Rightarrow D \quad D \Rightarrow B}{\Gamma, \mathcal{O}(A/B), \mathcal{O}(C/D) \Rightarrow \Delta} \text{D}$$
$$\frac{A \Rightarrow}{\Gamma, \mathcal{O}(A/B) \Rightarrow \Delta} \text{P}$$

A **sequent calculus** suitable for automatic proof search!

(A **sequent**  $A_1, \dots, A_n \Rightarrow B_1, \dots, B_m$  reads as  $\bigwedge_{i=1}^n A_i \rightarrow \bigvee_{j=1}^m B_j$ )

... so let's try to use the calculus!

Suppose that

- ▶ Śūdras must not study the Vedas:  $\mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{sdr})$
- ▶ Performing the Agnihotra sacrifice demands studying the Vedas:  $\text{agnhtr} \rightarrow \text{std\_vds}$

Question 1: May Śūdras perform Agnihotra?

$$\frac{\frac{\text{agnhtr} \Rightarrow \text{std\_vds}}{\neg\text{std\_vds} \Rightarrow \neg\text{agnhtr}} \quad \frac{\text{sdr} \Rightarrow \text{sdr}}{\text{sdr} \Rightarrow \text{sdr}} \quad \frac{\text{sdr} \Rightarrow \text{sdr}}{\text{sdr} \Rightarrow \text{sdr}}}{\mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{sdr}) \Rightarrow \mathcal{O}(\neg\text{agnhtr}/\text{sdr})} \text{Mon}_1$$

Answer: No, they must not!

... so let's try to use the calculus!

Suppose that

- ▶ Śūdras must not study the Vedas:  $\mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{sdr})$
- ▶ Performing the Agnihotra sacrifice demands studying the Vedas:  $\text{agnhtr} \rightarrow \text{std\_vds}$
- ▶ Chariot makers are Śūdras:  $\text{chmk} \rightarrow \text{sdr}$

Question 2: What about chariot makers?

$$\frac{\frac{\checkmark}{\neg\text{std\_vds} \Rightarrow \neg\text{std\_vds}} \quad \text{sdr} \xRightarrow{\text{X}} \text{chmk} \quad \frac{\checkmark}{\text{chmk} \Rightarrow \text{sdr}}}{\mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{sdr}) \Rightarrow \mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{chmk})} \text{Mon}_1$$

Answer: We can't derive anything!

(Because the logic is too weak in the second argument.)

## Part 2: Reasoning on conditions

## How to reason on the conditions?

We cannot introduce full downwards monotony for conditions:  
 $\mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{sdr})$  and  $\mathcal{O}(\text{agnhtr}/\text{chmk})$  would give

$$\mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{chmk}) \wedge \mathcal{O}(\text{std\_vds}/\text{chmk})$$

which is inconsistent with axiom ( $D$ ).

So we distinguish (**prima-facie**) **assumptions** from derived statements and use:

*Guṇapradhāna / specificity principle*

*More specific rules override more general ones.*

Discussed by Jaimini (2<sup>nd</sup> c. BCE)

To make this precise we split the assumptions into:

- ▶ propositional assumptions (**facts**):  $\bigwedge_{i \leq n} p_i \rightarrow \bigvee_{j \leq m} p_j$
- ▶ **deontic assumptions**:  $\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(A/B)$  with  $A, B$  propositional.

## Guṇapradhāna / Specificity intuitively

Idea: Use downwards monotonicity in the second argument...

$\text{agnhtr} \rightarrow \text{std\_vds}$

$\text{chmk} \rightarrow \text{sdr}$

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{sdr})$

$\sim \mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{chmk} \wedge \neg\text{upnyn})$

## Guṇapradhāna / Specificity intuitively

Idea: Use downwards monotonicity in the second argument if the obligation is not overruled by a more specific one. . .

agnhtr  $\rightarrow$  std\_vds

chmk  $\rightarrow$  sdr

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{sdr})$




$\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(\text{agnhtr}/\text{chmk})$

$\not\sim \mathcal{O}(\neg\text{std\_vds}/\text{chmk} \wedge \neg\text{upnyn})$

$\sim \mathcal{O}(\text{std\_vds}/\text{chmk} \wedge \neg\text{upnyn})$

## Guṇapradhāna / Specificity intuitively

**Idea:** Use downwards monotonicity in the second argument if the obligation is not overruled by a more specific one and if there is no other conflicting one which is not overruled itself.





## How to put this into sequents?

We derive an obligation  $\mathcal{O}(A/B)$  from deontic assumptions  $\mathfrak{L}$  if

- ▶ it is entailed by an applicable  $\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(C/D) \in \mathfrak{L} \dots$

$$\{B \Rightarrow D\} \quad \cup \quad \{C \Rightarrow A\}$$

---

$$\Rightarrow \mathcal{O}(A/B)$$

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which is not overruled by a conflicting more specific one

$$\{B \Rightarrow D\} \cup \{C \Rightarrow A\}$$

$$\left\{ \vee \left( \begin{array}{l} \{ \not\vdash B \Rightarrow F \} \\ \{ \not\vdash F \Rightarrow D \} \\ \{ \not\vdash E, A \Rightarrow \} \end{array} \right) \mid \mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(E/F) \in \mathfrak{L} \right\}$$

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- ▶ there is no other applicable conflicting obligation

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$$\left\{ \vee \left( \begin{array}{l} \{\not\vdash B \Rightarrow H\} \\ \{\not\vdash G, A \Rightarrow \} \end{array} \right) \mid \mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(G/H) \in \mathfrak{L} \right\}$$

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$$\Rightarrow \mathcal{O}(A/B)$$

$\mathcal{O}_R^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}}$

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- ▶ there is no other applicable conflicting obligation  
which is not overruled itself by a more specific one

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$$\left\{ \vee \left( \begin{array}{l} \{\not\vdash B \Rightarrow H\} \\ \{\not\vdash G, A \Rightarrow \} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \{B \Rightarrow J\} \\ \cup \{J \Rightarrow H\} \\ \cup \{I \Rightarrow A\} \end{array} \right\} \mid \mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(I/J) \in \mathfrak{L} \end{array} \right) \mid \mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(G/H) \in \mathfrak{L} \right\}$$

---

$$\Rightarrow \mathcal{O}(A/B)$$

 $\mathcal{O}_R^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}}$

## Wait ... underivability premisses?

The underivability premisses look fishy and smell like circular definitions. . .

Fortunately:

### Theorem.

Derivability for formulae of modal depth  $n + 1$  depends only on derivability of formulae of modal depth at most  $n$ .

So everything is well-defined, we escape a fixpoint definition and even get

### Theorem.

Derivability from assumptions is decidable in polynomial space.

$$\frac{\begin{array}{c} \vdots \\ \not\vdash B \Rightarrow F \\ \vdots \end{array}}{\Rightarrow \mathcal{O}(A/B)}$$

modal depth decreases

(with  $\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(E/F) \in \mathcal{L}$ ,  
hence no  $\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}$  in  $F$ )


## Bonus: Saving the twins (well ... at least one)

*Vikalpa / Disjunctive response:*

*When there is a real conflict between obligations, any of the conflicting injunctions may be adopted as option.*

Discussed by Jaimini (2<sup>nd</sup> c. BCE)

This principle actually follows from the methods and lets us reason about the drowning twins:




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
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
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$$\text{save\_twin1} \wedge \text{save\_twin2} \rightarrow \perp$$

$$\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(\text{save\_twin1}/\text{reach1})$$

$$\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(\text{save\_twin2}/\text{reach2})$$

$$\sim \mathcal{O}(\text{save\_twin1} \vee \text{save\_twin2} / \text{reach1} \wedge \text{reach2})$$

## Application: Comparing formalisations

The procedure also helps in comparing and adjusting formalisations of deontic assumptions using:

**Theorem.**

If  $\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(A/B) \in \mathfrak{L}$ , and  $\mathcal{O}(A/B)$  is not derivable, then there is an **explicit conflict**: a  $\mathcal{O}_{\text{pf}}(C/D) \in \mathfrak{L}$  with  $\vdash \neg(A \wedge C)$  and  $\vdash B \leftrightarrow D$ .


Explicit conflicts are bad:

A deontic assumption involved in an explicit conflict  
is never applied as written!

This suggests for a list of deontic assumptions:

- ▶ count explicit conflicts in a **conflict score**
- ▶ if possible, generate alternative formalisations
- ▶ evaluate the formalisations by minimising the conflict score.

## Application: Comparing interpretations




Natural  
language


Formal  
assumptions

Derived  
formulae

# Application: Comparing interpretations



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# What does this look like in practice?

Let the **implementation** work that out!

`http://subsell.logic.at/bprover/deonticProver/version1.2/`

## Summing up

In this line of work we have

- ▶ investigated proof-theoretic methods for converting axiom systems into analytic (sequent) calculi
- ▶ Obtained a known deontic logic from texts of the Mīmāṃsā school of Indian Philosophy
- ▶ Introduced a proof-theoretic mechanism for reasoning with conflicting obligations using specificity
- ▶ Implemented a tool which also helps to evaluate the formalisation of deontic assumptions

Thank you!

<https://mimamsa.logic.at>